Gallipoli 2

[JOHN THURSTON]

Well. I have to admit that the subject of the entire battle fought all along the beaches of Gallipolli was rather to large a subject for me to properly trans portport to you thru the web. But I will continue to take "licks" at (No not with the tongue youngsters) the basics and how they did or did not differ from the fighting on the western front. Initially, from the comments I heard and read from "Anzacs" (Australian and New Zealand expeditionary force) part of the survivors of which did go on to fight on the Western front. there was no indication that they thought the Western Front was worse.

We know one French and one British Battlecruiser were sunk by shelling and/or mines. Neither the British Nor any of the allies that fought with them new that the mine field in the affected area where the French (obsolete from the only pictures available as it does not appear in my reference book by Hough entitled "Dreadnought"Battleship Bouvet was sunk by mine. I have mentioned, I hope, that the allies were entirely unprepared in most places on the peninsula were horrifically unknown. No knowledge was passed on of the extremely rugged terrain and proliferation of impassable ravines (except if one just walk along their course on the bottoms, which floor mostly ran perpendicular to the desired goal; Itstanbul.

Their was no experience as to how to deal with early 20th weapons facing late with middle 19th century methods. or rather, I should say it was not known that whale boats do not and amphibious assault craft make. Even where the Exception to this rule was the Beaching of the small ex ferry "the River Clyde" upon one British beachhead, and the extention of handmade wooden ramps down the side, followed by a pontoon (loosely stated) was to allow the British troops to make it to the beach. I will talk of the regiment of Guy Nightingale which was more than decimated by Turkish fire, although Nightingale and the commanding officer of the Clyde went up and down the ramps and to the beach twice, where, at the same time as much as 70% of the troops disembarking from the Clyde where killed or wounded just making each's sole attempt to get to the fight. Insane? well, I have to say yes a this point in my life.

I do not think that the General's in charge of "Overlord" where unaware of the debacle at was then the only Major amphibious land attempt in the 20th century except those that had been undertaken prior to Overlord itself. Dieppe was another disaster. The German 'airborne assault" on Crete had been a success, but a success which came at such great cost that the German "Falschirmjaeger" were not again employed in significant numbers. The digression in this case seems necessary as the Allies were then aware of two disasters in marine assault form and one 'Phyrric" Air assault earlier in the war. the Japanese assaults on the "Fortress Singapore" were not in the least thwarted by the by the ingenious idea of "not confronting ' the strength of the british defenses facing seaward at the city. They Landed unopposed Up the malay peninsula, and proceeded to the relatively undefended landward side of the island on Singapore. It is only an island by virtue of the shallow Lahore strait where Yamashita's Force's arrived.

I am actually somewhat more prepared to discuss Singapore and Crete than the disaster at Gallipoli, but no mater, I will continue the task as well as I may.

On other beaches, their was little or no opposition.

It must has appeared slightly as "deju vu" to then First Lord of the admiralty Winston Churchill.

It is unclear to me whether the amphibious assault was meant to be a follow on to the naval forcing of the Dardanelles, which was the Ist Lord's favorite brainchild, it was made with 16 "battleships" (most of whom were not of the "Dreadnought" level, but it appears the amphibious operation was a "fallback" plan if the Naval "forcing" of the strait failed (and he more important goal of forcing the Turks out of the war with it)of course a naval forcing of this magnitude had always been rationally met with the argument that seaborne guns could never out fight land based batteries of anywhere an even chance of success. Apparently C.S. forester new this as it was sometime restated in his famous "Hornblower" novels.

Specifically, my finally found research library yields the following information: "British General Sir Ian Hamilton was out in charge of 75,00 men which included the aforesaid Anzacs and the british 29th division" along with a
French "colonial" division. If no one else watched the archealogical dig of a British Trench where the bodies of troops bearing apparent French "Colonials" led me to the conclusion that neither group were actually French, this omits the contribution of the French. which could have meant to be limited to the naval campaign. The more famous beaches were "Anzac cove" and " Green Beach". But there were three other beaches. The Mass Market picture book "Battle" says in horrendous understatement of the losses and butchery where the "River Clyde" beached itself (in an inadvertent attempt to mimic WWII's American LCI's (landing craft infantry)by saying that "British troops were shot up at one beach by Turkish machine guns but most of the forces got safely ashore. If this means only that one beach was a bloodbath, and the other less afflicted, it might be a quasi acceptable statement. Clearly I am going to have to continue this thread more and often, but I will leaven it with interspersed article of a slightly less daunting and bloody nature. I will Do it soon. A 'friend' in college 'borrowed' my three volume set on The Great war, and some vinyl alblums, and I never could chase him down on campus again. This lack of honor was egregious to me.

more later, I am sure you can hardly wait.