Police Liability & Exoneration Part 2

[Alan K]

Part two

Some deadly force cases are: Dean v. City of Worcester, 924 F. 2d 364, 367 (1st Cir. 1990) others cited hereunder.

Reactions of LEO to danger & Glint of Steel People v. Morales 603 NY Supp. 2d 319.
Sigman v Town of Chapel Hill 161 F. 3d 782 (4th Cir. 1998)

Common gestures: People v. Warren 613 NY Supp. 375 (1st Dept. 1994)

The case supporting a duty of a LEO to stop the threat to an officer or citizen is Daavis v. Freels 583 F. 2d 337, 341 (7th Cir 1978)

Intent of a LEO: Alexis v. McDonalds 67 F. 3d 341, 352 (1st Cir. 1995)

In Smith v. Freeland, 954 F. 2d , 343,347 (6th Cir. 1992) the court recognized the above cited Graham case as a leader and said that we must avoid our notions of proper police procedures for the instantaneous decision of the officer at the scene. We must never allow the theoretical sanitized world of our imagination replace the “dangerous” and complex world that policemen face every day. What constitutes ‘reasonable’ action may seem quite different to someone analyzing the question at leisure.

In Slatter v. Rizzo, 939 F. 2d 213 (4th Cir. 1991). An officer who shot a suspect was absolved of liability because it was objectively reasonable for the officer to have believed that the suspect was reaching for a gun when in fact the object in the suspect’s hand was a beer bottle.

In Lenagan v. Karnes 27 F. 3d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1994) a LEO was exonerated when he shot an unarmed suspect who appeared to be chasing another officer, although the suspect was unarmed and handcuffed in front, and the officer could not confirm that there was no weapon.
The court explained the mistaken belief doctrine: “A suspects failure to raise his hands in compliance with a police officer’s command to do so may support the existence if probable cause to believe that the suspect is armed. We do think it was wise to require a police officer, in all instances to actually detect the presence of an object in a suspect’s hands before firing on him. We will not second guess the split-second judgment of a trained police officer merely because that judgment turns out to be mistaken, particularly where inaction could have resulted in death or serious injury to the officer or others…section 1983 does not purport to redress injuries resulting from reasonable mistakes”

In the Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill case cited above, the 4th Circuit affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to police officers who shot and killed a suspect whom the officers perceived was holding a knife and began walking towards the officers.
The court noted that a police officer need not, in all circumstances, ‘actually detect the presence of an object in a suspect’s hands before firing upon him.” The court held that an officer may justifiably fire if he reasonably perceives that a suspect may have a weapon.

The article goes on to say that the Courts have structured a contextual text for the analysis of law enforcement use of force claims. Cases make clear that only the situation present at the precise moment of the use of force are to be factored into the “reasonable inquiry”. Cites Shultz v. Long, 44 F. 3d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1995).

If readers of this topic have enough interest, I will post the “Could Have Believed” Standard, which will include cases with brief facts wherein, “If an officer reasonably could have believed that the suspect was armed and might use the weapon against the officer, the shooting is justified.

Alan K